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INTRODUCTION

Many municipalities are currently experiencing a capital financing crisis
fueled by cutbacks in federal aid, decreases in state and municipal taxes, and,
frequently, an expanding population base. These developments have forced
municipalities to search for innovative methods of financing improvements to
infrastructure items such as sewer and water lines, roads and sidewalks, and
new or expanded recreational and educational facilities.
Exactions have provided municipalities with one particularly helpful
method of financing for these kinds of improvements. They permit
municipalities to transfer the financial burden associated with growth and
development onto the parties responsible for such growth: the developers
and residents of new developments. In the past decade, municipalities have
expanded the use of exactions as a financing mechanism beyond the more
traditional method of dedication of lands within a subdivision. These new
financing schemes include in-lieu fees, impact fees, and, most recently,
linkage. This expansion of the exaction concept has eased the financial crisis
of municipalities, but it has also raised a plethora of legal hurdles that
municipalities must now clear if exactions are to provide a reliable source of
funds in the future.
This article reviews the various forms of exactions and the concomitant
legal issues raised by the expansion of the exaction concept. It offers a model
of legislation that would best insulate a municipal ordinance from
invalidation, and thereby delineates a legislative scheme upon which
municipalities in need of a reliable source of funding may rely. The
discussion concludes with an analysis of linkage and a critical review of a
recent amendment to the city of Boston zoning ordinance that implements
linkage. The assessment of the Boston ordinance reveals that, in its current
formulation, it is susceptible to invalidation for reasons that go to the heart of
the controversy over exactions.
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II
DISCUSSION

A.

Types of Exactions

An exaction is essentially a condition of carrying forward a project in the
form of a contribution made by a developer to a municipality.I The payment
is ordinarily a condition precedent to the issuance of a special permit, a
conditional use permit, a subdivision approval, or an amendment to a zoning
map. The nature of the developer's contribution determines the type of
exaction. The most common and least controversial type of exaction is an
intradevelopmental dedication of land for streets, sidewalks, water and sewer
lines, and, more recently, land for recreational or educational purposes. 2
Municipalities also frequently require developers to construct specific
improvements such as sidewalks and streets in addition to dedicating the
lands for these uses. Although susceptible to legal challenge, 3 courts are least
likely to invalidate this type of exaction. Municipalities clearly have legitimate

general health, safety, and welfare interests in assuring adequate ingress and
egress from a new development, and such improvements are a necessary
adjunct

to

a

municipality's

zoning

or

subdivision

control

power.

Furthermore, this type of intradevelopmental exaction scheme is fair because
it places the costs of growth squarely upon the shoulders of those who created
the need and upon those who will directly benefit from the product of
the exaction. Municipalities can safely and confidently rely on intradevelopmental dedications of land, 4 because this type of dedication has the
appearance of a reasonable exercise of police power concerning land use
regulation.
1. See Diamond, The San Francisco Office/Housing Program: Social Policy Underuritten by Private
Enterprise, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 449, 455 (1983); Comment, Subdivision Exactions: The Constitutional
Issues, The JudicialResponse, and the Pennsylvania Situation, 19 VILL. L. REV. 782, 784 (1974). For an indepth discussion of the constitutional issues raised by exaction schemes, see Heyman & Gilhool, The
Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision
Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
2. The dedication of land for park purposes within a subdivision was first considered and
affirmed in In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931). Since then,
courts have not had particular difficulty with the notion ofintradevelopmental exactions. See Pavelko,
Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 J. URB. CONST. L. 269, 273-76 (1983); see also
Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 324-28, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 689-91
(1981) (payment of fees or dedication of lands for schools is proper police power regulation);
Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 Ill. App. 3d 334, 338, 354 N.E.2d 489, 494 (1976) (municipalities
are vitally interested in adequate provision of educational and recreational resources), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d
352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
3. One would challenge a dedication requirement on the same basis as any other exaction,
raising the constitutional issues associated with a taking of property for "what might otherwise have
been characterized as municipal functions." Comment, supra note 1, at 785. Acute legal problems
may arise where the dedication requirement is stated as a percentage of the area of land developed.
See J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 583-85, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981); Frank
Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 71-72, 264 A.2d 910, 914-15 (1970).
4. Although municipalities might well rest content with any source of funding, this discussion
focuses upon those sources of funds that may provide a reliable or steady source of funds.
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Dedication, however, is a very limited method of land use regulation and
simply cannot resolve the complex municipal problems associated with rapid
growth. Smaller developments, for example, may not have the requisite space
available for a dedication of land for recreational or educational purposes.
Nonetheless, a series of such smaller developments clearly will create a need
for parks and schools. Unless the municipality has access to an alternative
type of exaction, it could find itself supplying newcomers with parks and
schools from the general revenues of the municipality-a situation that passes
the direct costs of growth on to all residents. The in-lieu fee has emerged to
manage such a situation, and has become an important and reliable method of
municipal financing of improvements. 5 In those cases where the dedication of
land or construction of improvements within the development site is not
appropriate, many municipal ordinances now provide that developers may
proceed with construction if they pay a fee in lieu of the land dedication. The
municipality may then collect and pool these fees. A properly drafted
ordinance must specify that the use of the fees is limited to the eventual
acquisition of a park or construction of a school that will primarily, although
not exclusively, benefit the residents of the new development.
In-lieu fees have thus emerged as an outgrowth of dedication. With
proper enabling legislation and an appropriately delimited use of proceeds,
courts will very likely conclude that in-lieu fees are as uncontroversial a
method of land use regulation as intradevelopmental dedication. In-lieu fees
have a narrow focus, however: these fees are conceptually tied to the same
type of use ordinarily associated with land dedication. Those municipalities
that have experienced rapid growth confront the problem that growth strains
and frequently requires the expansion or reconstruction of the capital
infrastructure of the municipality. Although a municipality's capital
infrastructure is outside the scope of the new development, the condition of
that infrastructure may be vital to the success of a development. For example,
a municipality may need a water treatment plant or require a new or improved
road system. The municipality must confront the issue of the means to pay
for these improvements. Traditional in-lieu fees, of course, simply do not
reach these extradevelopmental ramifications of growth. Lacking an
alternative source of funding, municipalities may be confronted with the
prospect of constructing new or rehabilitating existing infrastructure items
from their general revenues because of needs created by new developments.
Once again, municipalities have looked for a method that would require the
creators of the need for improvements to bear the costs associated with
growth. Impact fees, "charges levied by local governments against new
development in order to generate revenue for capital funding necessitated by

5.

See J. JUERGENSMEYER, FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE:

PAYING THE COSTS OF GROWrH THROUGH

IMPACT FEES AND OTHER LAND REGULATION CHARGES 2-3 (1985); see aLso Jacobsen & Redding, Making

Development Pay Its Way, 55 N.C.L. REV. 407, 407 (1977); Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An
Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 418 (1981).
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the new development," 6 have emerged as one solution. Although more
susceptible to successful legal challenge by developers, the impact fee has
served very well as a mechanism for municipalities wishing to finance the
extradevelopmental costs of growth. If equitably implemented, that is, if
proportionate payments and empirical data tie cost increases to new
development, such fees also have the indicia of a legitimate method of land
use regulation.
The exaction mechanisms discussed thus far bear a family resemblance to
one another and can be placed on a continuum. It is clear that suburban
growth first had immediate and then broader consequences, and exactions
expanded to meet these consequences. One can understand that
municipalities, always strapped for funds and yet bound to provide services,
would respond with a type of exaction that would manage the expanding
consequences of growth. The most recent development in this area of the
law, linkage, seems to represent a movement off this continuum. The family
resemblance to traditional exaction schemes, although present, is faint.
Linkage requires developers to contribute toward, or construct housing for,
those who will purportedly come to the city because of the new construction.
The contribution may take the form of a condition precedent for special
permit approval. Linkage thus extends the exaction notion to an
unprecedented area-the housing market. Unlike the other exaction schemes
and despite the veneer, it appears that linkage is less a method of making
development pay its way 7 than a way of providing "a steady local foundation
for . . .housing development that is not subject to the vagaries of national
policy or the local budget process." 8 In other words, linkage functions
primarily, not incidentally, as a means of implementing social policy. In this
sense, linkage is more susceptible to constitutional challenges because it
possesses less of the appearance of reasonability and fairness than do the
other types of exaction.
With this conceptual framework established, this article will now discuss
the legal issues raised by the various exaction regimes. In particular, it will
focus on the type of municipal ordinance that will both raise funds and yet
withstand legal challenge. This analysis is important in an age of declining
federal involvement and lower state and municipal real estate tax revenues,
because municipalities need a steady reservoir of funding in order to pay for
needed improvements.
6. J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 2; see also Jacobsen and Redding, supra note 5, at 408-11.
7. The basis of any claim arguing in favor of the reasonability of legitimate land use regulations
is the notion that a development should pay the municipal costs created by it. This notion also
justifies the claim by municipalities that the imposition of such exaction fees is fundamentally fair. See
Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 637-47, 484 P.2d 606, 610-17, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630, 634-41, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of
Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 318-21 (Fla. 1976), reconsideredon appealfrom unpublishedremand, 358 So. 2d
846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
8. Tegeler, Developer Payments and Downtown Housing Trust Funds, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 679,
680 (1984).
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Legal Issues: The Importance of Enabling Legislation

The initial and perhaps critical hurdle confronting any municipal exaction
scheme is adequate state enabling legislation. On numerous occasions courts
have invalidated municipal ordinances not expressly authorized by state
constitution or statute. 9 City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co. 10 illustrates
the potential problem nicely. In City of Montgomery, a state statute authorized
town planning commissions "to adopt regulations providing 'for adequate
and convenient open spaces for . . . recreation.' "I I Pursuant to this
legislation, the city implemented subdivision regulations requiring
subdivision developers to dedicate .18 acres per dwelling unit constructed, or
to donate an in-lieu fee to a fund held for the acquisition of public parks and
playgrounds.
The court perfunctorily invalidated the ordinance, noting only that the
enabling legislation did not specifically authorize the fee payment in lieu of
the land dedication as a condition of approval of a subdivision plat.12 Absent
such specific legislative authorization, the court concluded that "the City of
Montgomery has no implied power to require the payment of a fee in lieu of
13
dedication of land for public parks."'
City of Montgomery serves as a lesson to the state legislature: in establishing
exaction schemes it should make grants broad, yet specific. The grant should
authorize municipalities to provide for the full range of exactions and then
leave them with the discretion to determine the type of exaction appropriate
in a particular case.
Such legislation is a heuristic device rather than a reality, however. In fact,
in most cases there is no express legislation at all. Municipalities simply enact
ordinances authorizing a range of exactions in reliance upon an implied
power pursuant to, for example, a home rule amendment. Although courts
have upheld exactions under home rule authority,' 4 such an implied power
remains susceptible to too many successful legal challenges. In Middlesex &
Boston Street Railway v. Board of Aldermen, '5 for example, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts invalidated a special permit condition requiring that a
developer lease five of his fifty-four units to the city housing authority, despite
the existence of a home rule amendment. The developer in Middlesex required
a special permit to construct his project, and the Newton zoning ordinance
authorized the Board of Aldermen to grant such permits. The court
acknowledged that the Board could grant the developer a special permit, but
9. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 385, 389-91, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 1194-95, 465
N.Y.S.2d 865, 866-67 (1983); Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 206, 208-12, 441
N.E.2d 1076, 1077-79, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559-61 (1982) (town derives its power to regulate land
uses from legislature).
10. 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978).
11. Id. at 364.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 365.
14. See, e.g., Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo. 1983) (municipal fee for
connecting to municipal water and sewer lines affirmed as implied from home rule authority).
15. 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 1279 (1977).
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ruled that it could not extract the aforementioned exaction.' 6 The court
explicitly rejected the Board's purported reliance upon the Massachusetts
Home Rule Amendment' 7 and noted that "[t]here is no language anywhere in
the [state] statute or in the Newton zoning ordinance which expressly
authorized the Board to impose [the condition]." 1 8 Although home rule is
the best option available in many circumstances, many municipalities still view
it as susceptible to scrutiny and invalidation by more conservative courts.
The municipality must jump a second hurdle in order to avoid a judicial
conclusion that the particular exaction is a tax. Enabling legislation often
plays a critical role in this determination. Enabling legislation is so critical
because, once a court attaches the label "taxation" to the ordinance, the court
will invalidate it unless the municipality has received an express delegation of
taxing authority.' 9 Such an express delegation rarely exists, thus the label
20
becomes, as the commentators have noted, outcome determinative.
Home Builders Association v. Riddel 2 l illustrates the dilemma. In Riddel, the
municipal ordinance required that developers pay a set fee for each unit of
residential construction. The fees would be collected, pooled, and later used
to provide parks and recreational facilities for the community. The Riddel
court first noted that municipalities have the power to tax "only to the extent
to which it is clearly conferred by the charter or state statutes." 22 The city
charter did grant it "all powers possible for a city under the constitution and
laws of the State of Arizona." 23 Despite such a broad grant of authority, the
court refused to imply the grant of a tax collecting power. It invalidated the
ordinance as an illicit tax because the charter did not "specifically
authorize" 24 the tax found in the municipal ordinance.
A recent Florida case, Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 25 illuminates
a related point. In Lands End, an ordinance required developers to dedicate
land for, or to pay a fee to acquire, land for parks and open spaces. Any fees
collected would be "expended solely for the acquisition, improvement,
16. Id. at 855, 359 N.E.2d at 1282.
17. Id. at 856, 359 N.E.2d at 1283. Under home rule authority, a municipality may enact zoning
regulations for the health and general welfare of a municipality. See MASS. CONST. amended art. II,
§ 1; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 43B, §§ 1-20 (Law. Co-op. 1986); see also Marshfield Family Skateland v.

Town of Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 440-41, 446, 450 N.E.2d 605, 608, 611 (1983); Board of Appeals
v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 358-60, 294 N.E.2d 393, 409-10 (1973).
18. 371 Mass. at 856, 359 N.E.2d at 1283 (emphasis added). The court did note that "[tihere is
no constitutional obstacle to the accomplishment of the ends contemplated by the board . . .[the
ends being] the provision of adequate housing for low income and elderly persons." Id. at 857, 359
N.E.2d at 1284.
19. See Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 809, 650 P.2d 193, 195
(1982) (county must have express power to tax developers) (superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 82.02.020 (Supp. 1987)).
20. See J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 4-7; Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 5, at 422-27.
21. 109 Ariz. 404, 510 P.2d 376 (1973).
22. Id. at 406, 510 P.2d at 378 (quoting Phoenix v. Arizona Sash, Door & Glass Co., 80 Ariz.
100, 102-03, 293 P.2d 438, 439, modified, 80 Ariz. 239, 295 P.2d 854 (1956)).
23.

Id.

24. Id. at 407, 510 P.2d at 379. The court also noted that "the primary effect [of the regulation]
is to benefit the public at large." Id.
25. 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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expansion of Town Parks, open space land and land for specified Town
purposes and facilities required as capital improvements . *..."26
The court
held that the ordinance imposed an invalid tax because "there [was] no real
guarantee that the funds collected will actually be used to promote the
development and acquisition of open space and park land, the need for which
27
is generated by the new development."
A review of the cases and commentary on taxation versus regulation adds
few conceptual insights into the nature of either legal notion. Examination of
the wreckage of invalidated ordinances, however, makes clear that an
ordinance is more likely to attract the regulation label and thereby to
withstand a legal challenge if: (a) there is clear enabling legislation
authorizing the imposition of a fee; and (b) the fees collected are marked for
purposes that will primarily benefit the residents of the new development.
Conceptual tidiness aside, these factors create the appearance of a police
power regulation and maximize the likelihood that the ordinance is valid.
C.

Standards of Judicial Review: A Proposed Model of Legislation

Once a municipality establishes that its exaction scheme is authorized by
some express or implied state authority and that any fees paid pursuant
thereto do not constitute a tax, the legality of the scheme still may not
withstand attack on several ordinarily constitutional grounds. The courts
might invalidate an exaction program as violative of due process or equal
protection, 2 8 or as an unconstitutional taking. The fundamental source of
authority for any exaction scheme is the police power, and the legitimacy
of exactions is therefore ordinarily determined with reference to a
reasonableness standard. It is therefore necessary to focus on the various
standards of reasonableness that courts have formulated when construing the
validity of exactions.
A court will usually review the reasonability of an exaction under one of
three tests: (1) the "strict need or direct benefit" test; (2) the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test; or (3) the "rational nexus" test. 2 9 Gulest Associates
26. Id. at 575.
27. Id. at 576; cf. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (exaction should "offset, but not exceed, reasonable needs sufficiently attributable to the new
subdivision residents and . . . the funds collected [should be] adequately earmarked for the
acquisition of capital assets that will sufficiently benefit those new residents."); Coates v. Planning
Bd., 58 N.Y.2d 800, 802, 445 N.E.2d 642, 643, 459 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (1983) (fees imposed that
cover municipality's costs are not arbitrary and capricious, especially "since the village code requires
the unexpended portions of such fees be refunded to petitioners.").
28. The equal protection claims will not be discussed in any detail because an exaction program
need only avoid the label "palpably arbitrary" in order to survive an equal protection challenge. See,
e.g., Norsco Enters. v. City of Fremont, 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 498, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659, 665 (1976).
29. Municipal ordinances requiring dedication also have been upheld on various other theories.
See Note, Mandatory Dedicationof Land by Land Developers, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 41 (1973); see also Pavelko,
supra note 2, at 283 (privilege test).
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v. Town of Newburgh3 0 best illustrates the direct benefit test. In Gulest, a
municipal ordinance conditioned approval of subdivision plats on the
payment of fees to the Town Board for use in the improvement or acquisition
of neighborhood parks and playgrounds. There was no requirement that the
town use the money collected in a way that would benefit the residents of the
subdivision. Rather, the exaction funds passed into general revenues and
were available for general playground and recreational purposes. The court
held that the ordinance constituted a taking without due process of law, as
well as a violation of the equal protection clause, precisely because the
exactions were available for general recreational revenue purposes. 3' In
other words, residents of the subdivision who ultimately paid the exaction
received no direct benefits from their payments.
32
The now famous Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect
first articulated the specifically and uniquely attributable test and remains an
excellent illustration. Pioneer was an "easy case." It involved an ordinance
requiring the intradevelopmental dedication of land for schools. The
specified acreage of land to be dedicated was computed on the basis of the
number of residential lots constructed. The stipulated facts indicated,
however, that the town's school facilities had been utilized to capacity prior to
the proposed development. The need for additional schools was therefore
not specifically and uniquely attributable to the development.3 3 The court
determined that, on the basis of the stipulated facts, the dedication
requirement constituted a forbidden "confiscation of private property in
contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable
34
regulation under the police power."
As the commentators have noted, these tests establish criteria with which a
municipality may be unable to demonstrate compliance once population
growth has started to strain a municipality's infrastructure. 3 5 In many
instances, the strain on infrastructure results from the cumulative effect of
several developments in the recent past rather than the simple presence of a
single development. A municipality may therefore find it impossible to
demonstrate conclusively that the proceeds of an exaction will directly benefit
a particular contributor or that the needs for new or expanded infrastructure
are directly attributable to a development. Because of these difficulties, most
courts now adhere to a third test: the rational nexus test, first articulated in
30. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aft'd, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538
(1962). Gulest was overruled with respect to its holding concerning the vagueness of the Newburgh
statute in jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
31. 25 Misc. 2d at 1007-08, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33.
32. 22 Ill.
2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
33. Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802. The court observed that "the school problem which allegedly
exists here is one which the subdivider should not be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying." Id.
(emphasis added). Presumably, a proportionate contribution would not have constituted a taking.
34. Id.; see also Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 111. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd,
68 Il1. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
35. See Pavelko, supra note 2, at 291. See generally J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5.
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Village of Menomonee Falls.3 6 Jordan concerned in-lieu fees or

dedication requirements for extradevelopmental educational and recreational
purposes. The court acknowledged that the municipal needs were not directly
attributable to each developer and his development, but held that the test
should focus on whether the need for infrastructure is sufficiently attributable to
the activities of the developer to justify an exaction. Furthermore, the court
did not require the municipality to prove that the development would be the
sole beneficiary of the facility constructed or repaired with the
extradevelopmental fee. The municipality had to show only that the residents
of the development would receive benefits in reasonable proportion to their
37
contribution to the facility's construction.
The rational nexus test provides the best framework for addressing the
validity of an exaction scheme because it considers the needs of the
community and is at the same time fair to the developer. Developments
do in fact have significant extradevelopmental impacts on infrastructure.
Continued subdivision approvals may stretch a school system or a water and
sewage system beyond capacity, requiring a significant expenditure of
municipal funds. On the other hand, developers, and ultimately the residents
of a development, should not pay for improvements that are not reasonably
related to the development's impact on infrastructure and from which the
residents will not derive any benefit. The solution, of course, is to tie a
developer's contribution to the costs that are reasonably attributable to his
development. In summary, a rule of law that expressly addresses the issue
whether an exaction is reasonably and proportionally related to need and
benefit is clearly the better rule.
This brief review of the principal legal issues confronting municipalities
that seek to implement exaction schemes reveals a reasonable course that
municipalities can follow. More importantly, the case law indicates that if the
municipal ordinance is properly authorized and if the exaction satisfies the
appropriate legal standard of reasonableness, municipalities will have a
source of funds available for educational and recreational projects as well as
infrastructure improvements.
D.

Applying the Proposed Rule: The Linkage Program in Boston

An important infrastructure problem confronting many municipalities
today is a shortage of housing. Linkage programs, which represent the latest
development in the expanding circle of exactions, have been used by
municipalities to address the housing shortage dilemma. A linkage program
attempts to tie large downtown developments to the construction of new
housing. The program accomplishes this result by requiring developers
either to pay a fee or actually to build such housing as a condition of receiving
36.
37.

28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
Id. at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447-48.
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development approval for a proposed project. Simply put, the plan seeks to
spread the downtown's prosperity into the neighborhoods.
If legally permissible, municipalities that are experiencing significant
commercial development and prosperity, but that also have an older housing
stock and a tight housing market, would find linkage schemes particularly
attractive. Moreover, the time is right for linkage-cutbacks in federal
assistance to low- and moderate-income housing construction as well as
taxpayer revolts make linkage a possibly critical source of municipal funding
for housing. The linkage ordinance recently enacted by the city of Boston will
be used as a focus for discussion of the legal issues raised by a linkage
38
program.
The city of Boston enacted its linkage program in 1983. Prior to the
enactment, the city had conducted several planning studies. The Advisory
Group report on linkage between downtown development and neighborhood
housing revealed that Boston was a prime candidate for linkage. 39 The study
discussed the increasing problems of housing affordability and decreasing
public resources available for housing experienced by Boston, and noted the
recent rapid and substantial development in the downtown area. 40 The
Advisory Group also noted that the median income of Boston's population
was below that of other cities, and that housing in general, but housing for
low- and moderate-income people in particular, was scarce. It concluded that
a booming downtown that abutted busted neighborhoods seemed perfectly
41
suited for a linkage program.
The Boston program applies only to substantial projects that are defined
as new construction and rehabilitation projects of more than 100,000 square
feet. As a prerequisite for granting any conditional use permit or allowing any
variance, exception, or amendment to the zoning map, the ordinance requires
that developers agree to pay a development impact project exaction of $5 per
42
square foot for each square foot over the 100,000 square foot threshold.
The linkage fee is payable in seven equal annual installments with the first
installment due upon issuance of the building permit, followed by six
payments due annually thereafter. The exactions are paid to a Neighborhood
Housing Trust, which administers the funds that are received pursuant to the
43
program.
38. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26 (1983), amended by BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art.
26A (1986). For an excellent review of the linkage program in San Francisco, see Diamond, supra
note 1. At this time several cities are considering implementing linkage programs, including Denver
and Seattle. Cambridge, Massachusetts, recently rejected a linkage program.
39. ADVISORY GROUP, LINKAGE BETWEEN DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD
HOUSING: REPORT TO THE MAYOR 1 (1983) [hereinafter ADVISORY GROUP REPORT]. The group

observed that "[a]ffordability of housing is a major problem, particularly for Boston's tenants." id.at
6.
40. Id. at 5-7.
41. Id.at 9.
42. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26A, § 2(3)(b) (1986).
43. Id. § 2(3).

Page 69: Winter 1987]

FROM DEDICATION

To

LINKAGE

It is not yet clear whether this program will withstand legal challenge. The
Suffolk County Superior Court recently held the linkage ordinance invalid in
Bonan v. General Hospital Corp.44 Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court subsequently vacated that decision on procedural grounds, 4 5 the
superior court opinion is instructive because it indicates the probable results
of further attacks on the ordinance. In particular, it illustrates the
dependence of the outcome upon state statutory and case law.
The superior court judge held that Boston's Zoning Commission (the
legislative body having authority to enact zoning ordinances in Boston) is
bound by the legislature's delegation of power, and that linkage is not a
zoning power authorized expressly or by implication in Boston's special
zoning enabling act. 4 6 Boston is not subject to the general Massachusetts
Zoning Enabling Act 4 7 because, pursuant to a special act of the legislature in
1956, Boston was authorized to establish its own system of zoning
regulations. 4 8 The superior court judge found that the express grant of
powers contained in Boston's special zoning enabling act was limited to
typical height, bulk, and density dimensional controls, together with typical
use controls. The special act did not, however, expressly contain the power to
exact a fee, tax, or in-kind contribution as the linkage ordinance purported to
contain. The superior court relied on Middlesex, 49 in which the supreme
judicial court held that there was no express grant of authority for a linkage
program under the general Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act. 50 At the time
of Middlesex, both enabling acts were similar in all material respects. The

44. No. 76438 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1986) (order granting summary judgment), rev'd sub
nom. Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986). The plaintiffs were Boston
residential property owners who opposed an amendment to an existing Planned Development Area
(PDA) designation which would have allowed a neighboring hospital to increase the density ratios
and size of its facilities. Approval of the amendment required linkage payments which, the plaintiffs
alleged, were the city's primary motivation for granting the approval and were exacted under an
unauthorized and therefore unlawful scheme.
45. Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986). The court held that
summary judgment against defendants in the superior court had been premature because the
defendants had filed no responsive pleadings and there was no agreement as to the facts. Moreover,
it held that plaintiffs failed to state an actual controversy entitling them to declaratory relief. Finally,
it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the validity of the linkage ordinance. See also
lodice v. City of Newton, 397 Mass. 329, 491 N.E.2d 618 (1986), an earlier challenge to a 10% lowincome set-aside requirement enacted by a municipality under the commonwealth's General Zoning
Enabling Act, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 40A (Law. Co-op. 1985). In lodice, the supremejudicial court also
disposed of the case upon a narrow procedural ground, holding that the action was in essence the
complaint of a person aggrieved by the decision of a special permit granting authority and,
accordingly, must have been brought within the statutorily mandated appeal period of 20 days
following the filing of the decision.
46. Bonan, slip. op. at 14-19. The program in San Francisco also suffers from a lack of clear
enabling legislation. See Diamond, supra note 1, at 462-66. Diamond recommends, however, that the
city adopt the program.
47. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, §§ 1-17 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
48. 1956 Mass. Acts ch. 665.
49. 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 1279 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
50. Id.; see MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 40A, §§ 1-17 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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superior court thus held that it could "safely conclude" that there was no
51
express authorization for linkage.
The superior court also refused to imply authorization to enact the linkage
ordinance. The city argued that Boston's special zoning enabling act
authorizes it to regulate land uses in order "to avoid undue concentration of
population, to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements ... to encourage the
most appropriate use of the land throughout the city; and to preserve and
increase [the city's] amenities." 52 The court responded that although linkage
might bear a substantial relation to these purposes for which the zoning power
may be used, the zoning powers delegated for achieving these purposes were
limited, and to accept this argument was to fail to distinguish zoning purposes
3
from zoning powers. 5

The court further observed that three additional considerations reinforced
its conclusions regarding the lack of implied authorization: (1) fees are
expressly authorized elsewhere in Boston's special zoning enabling act;
(2) the linkage payment would, under Massachusetts law, be characterized as a
tax, and accordingly could not be authorized except by an express
authorization; 54 and (3) the legislature, after the Middlesex case, had
specifically amended the general zoning enabling act to authorize certain
linkage provisions, but had not made parallel changes in Boston's special
55
zoning enabling act.

Although this first holding was dispositive, the court went on to address
the characterization of the linkage payment as a regulatory fee or a tax. In so
doing, the court relied on Emerson College v. City of Boston, 56 a recent
Massachusetts decision in which the court analyzed the criteria for
distinguishing a regulatory fee from a tax. In Emerson College, the state
legislature authorized Boston to impose a fee for augmented fire services
availability (AFSA) on "certain buildings that 'by reason of their size, type of
construction, use and other relevant factors . . . require the city to employ

additional firefighters, deploy additional equipment and purchase equipment
different in kind from that required to provide fire protection for the majority
of structures.' -57 The city levied a fee that was an exaction aimed at large
developments and institutions, and Emerson College challenged the validity
of the ordinance authorizing the fee. The supreme judicial court addressed
the nature of the monetary exaction and whether the exaction was in fact part
51. Bonan, slip. op. at 16.
52. 1956 Mass. Acts ch. 665, § 2, cited in id. at 17.
53. Bonan, slip op. at 17-18.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 56-61.
55. Bonan, slip op. at 18-21.
56. 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098 (1984) (fee for augmented fire services availability, aimed
only at large developments and institutions, held an illicit tax when used for maintenance of facilities
for general public).
57. Id. at 416, 462 N.E.2d at 1100; see 1982 Mass. Acts ch. 190, § 30.
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of a scheme to have owners of private property provide a service that is
actually a general function of government.
Under the court's analysis, the monetary exaction must be categorized as
either a fee or a tax. Fees are either user fees, imposed on a proprietor for
instrumentalities used, such as the sewage system, or regulatory fees, founded
on the police power to regulate businesses and activities. In either case,
however, fees, as opposed to taxes, are charged in exchange for particular
governmental services benefiting the payer and "are collected, not to raise
revenues but to compensate the governmental entity providing the services
for its expenses." 58 Finally, fees paid for services should benefit the particular
group incurring the expense. The court found that the program was an illicit
tax because the AFSA exaction was paid both for possible services and to
maintain facilities that were used to provide essential services to the general
59
public.
In light of these criteria, the superior court in Bonan concluded that
linkage "more closely resembles a tax than a fee" and that "its primary
purpose is to raise revenues . . . to be expended for the common good

through the construction of low and moderate income housing." 60 It held
that "the size and revenue raising function of the [linkage payment] warrants
that it be considered a tax for purposes of statutory authorization and
construction."

6

1

The superior court concluded that whether the linkage payment was a fee
or a tax, it was not authorized by statute, and therefore the ordinance was a
nullity. The court also invalidated any zoning relief the city had granted to
the defendant that was contingent upon the linkage exaction. 6 2 The court has
thus paved the way for future challenges to Boston's linkage ordinance.
Undoubtedly, both the absence of express legislative authorization for linkage
and the striking similarity of linkage payments to a source of general revenue
will continue to present substantial obstacles for defenders of the ordinance.
Although the supreme judicial court vacated the superior court decision
on procedural grounds, the substantive analysis of Bonan and Emerson College
continue to be troublesome for municipalities planning to implement linkage.
The city of Boston does not collect the linkage fee as compensation for
services provided or for the use of its instrumentalities. Instead, it is a source
of general funds to solve a perceived social problem: a shortage of affordable
housing in Boston. The linkage fees in the Boston Zoning Code bear a
striking similarity to a source of general revenue to a city in need rather than a
58. Id. at 425, 462 N.E.2d at 1105. In Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, the court found that a
purported development fee was a tax, the purpose of which was to assist the municipality in realizing
a public purpose which required funding. 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 1983 (1982) (superseded by
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.020 (Supp. 1987)).
59. 391 Mass. at 427, 462 N.E.2d at 1106.
60. Bonan v. General Hosp. Corp., No. 76438, slip op. at 20 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1986)
(order granting summary judgment).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 21.
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fee for services. The AFSA scheme in Emerson College had the effect of
requiring property owners to provide a general service ordinarily provided by
municipal government. Linkage fees are strikingly similar. They serve as a
poor disguise for requiring developers to provide low- and moderate-income
housing, 63 a service that is ordinarily provided by government.
The city may face additional hurdles in future challenges. Even if Boston's
linkage exactions are viewed as regulatory fees, they must still pass the
reasonability test generally applied to any police power regulation. The
amendment justifies the linkage program by reasoning that a commercial
64
development should pay for the housing needs created by the development.
This argument has traditionally been used to justify impact fees: development
creates strain on the capital infrastructure of a municipality, now extended to
include housing, and such development should pay the costs of repairing,
extending, or constructing such infrastructure. The primary problem is that

neither the Advisory Group nor the Zoning Commission incorporated
adequate empirical findings of fact regarding the impact of commercial
development on housing in Boston. It therefore could not tie such findings to
the formula used to compute the linkage fee. The lack of findings makes the
fee vulnerable to a judicial determination that it is an arbitrary and capricious
imposition rather than a reasonable method of land use regulation. The lack
of a reasonable connection between commercial development and the
housing shortage may cause particular troubles to defenders of the Boston
program. The supreme judicial court, in Emerson College, has already noted
that fees paid should benefit the group incurring the expense. 65 The absence
of findings of fact on the impact of development, and a corresponding
formula, raise serious doubts that the Boston program will withstand further
66
judicial review.
These flaws in the Boston program are peculiar to it. Properly drafted
linkage programs that are supported by findings of fact and enacted pursuant
to police power authority may still be legally viable. As one commentator has
noted, linkage bears some resemblance to inclusionary zoning, a mode of land
use regulation that has gained broad public and judicial acceptance. 6 7 If a
municipality establishes that development causes a shortage of a necessary
63. Diamond, supra note 1, at 462-80, maintains that the San Francisco program is valid under
California law. She reaches this conclusion because, under California law, the exactions may be
based on future needs, and the fee formula is more closely related to the likely impact of the project.
The Boston program was never meant to be anything but a way of implementing social policy. The
study notes that it "was charged to investigate how to effect linkage, not whether there should be
linkage." Consequently, there is not even a representation that there is "a cause and effect
relationship between large-scale development activity and the shortage of affordable housing in the
neighborhoods." See ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 39, at 2.
64. Unfortunately, the study did not isolate the impact or tie the fee formula to such impact.
65. 391 Mass. at 426, 466 N.E.2d at 1106.
66. Because Boston is not subject to the state zoning law, it appears that it may not rely upon
implicit powers under home rule authority. See Emerson College v. City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415,
462 N.E.2d 1098 (1984); Banquer Realty Co. v. Acting Bldg. Comm'r, 389 Mass. 565, 571 n.6, 451
N.E.2d 422, 426 n.6 (1983).
67. See Tegeler, supra note 8, at 680-81, 691-92.
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item like housing, it can then argue that in order to remedy that shortage,
linkage is a legitimate and necessary exercise of its police power. It appears,
however, that such programs will meet the same resistance that initially
confronted impact fees. As a result, municipalities must draft their linkage
programs to meet the same legal tests that courts have applied to impact fee
programs. The core elements of these tests are clear legislative authorization
of linkage, a demonstration that commercial developments do in fact strain
the housing market, and a specific correlation between the fee structure and
the impact. The municipality must persuade the court that the costs are
sufficiently attributable to, and the benefits reach, the development or those
68
persons likely to be drawn to the city because of the development.
III
CONCLUSION

Exactions are now entrenched as a form of municipal financing and land
use regulation, and developers must learn to live with them. Given the
current financial difficulties of many cities, it is likely that municipalities will
attempt to expand still further the circle of exactions. In a world of
competing interests, an approach consistent with the rule of law should limit
the expanding circle by using the reasonability tests thus far developed by the
courts. It is fair for a developer to pay for the socioeconomic costs of his
development. The payments must, however, reasonably match the municipal
costs incurred because of such development, and the development must
receive concrete benefit from the improvements.
A problem arises with certain expansions of the exaction circle, such as
Boston's linkage program. It is possible that municipal needs for
infrastructure improvements and developer needs to proceed with
construction may rupture the delicate balance forged by the case law. Perhaps
the best way to assure the preservation of the rule of law in this volatile area is
to adhere to the above outlined model of express legislation and specific,
detailed findings of fact. This model assures reasonablility by requiring a
proportionate balancing of competing interests. Although this model will
require developers to pay exactions in certain cases, it is the only assurance
there is that, as Justice Holmes noted in an early taking case, "a strong public
desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 6 9

68. Diamond goes so far as to suggest that the housing funds received in connection with a
linkage program should be used "to build housing that exactly [matches] the income profile of office
tenants." Diamond, supra note 1, at 473. This suggestion, of course, may mean that the housing
units constructed pursuant to a linkage program will benefit middle-income urban professionals
rather than the poor.
69. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).

